Description
TL;DR: A research construction for large participant lotteries using logarithmic rounds, with efficient Ethereum execution and heavier Bitcoin setup costs.
About This Document
Andrew Miller and Iddo Bentov arrange participants in a tournament bracket so deposits and commitments can be resolved without a central pot or trusted operator. They analyze fairness, abort behavior, and on-chain costs, presenting an efficient Ethereum design and explaining why Bitcoin's scripting limits lead to an exponential off-chain setup unless a small protocol change is made.
Why Bitcoin People May Care
The paper exposes how scripting capabilities shape seemingly simple multiparty applications. It is a cryptographic protocol study, not a recommendation to gamble, a deployed service, or a guarantee of legal availability. Its Bitcoin cost conclusions reflect the script features and fee model discussed in the 2016–2017 version, not every later wallet or layer.
What You Receive
Purchase reveals the verified preserved PDF location for this document.
Document Details
- Title: Zero-Collateral Lotteries in Bitcoin and Ethereum
- Author / organization: Andrew Miller and Iddo Bentov
- Year: 2017 version
- Language: English
- Document type: Cryptocurrency protocol research paper
- Pages: 17
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