Description
TL;DR: A game-theoretic distributed-systems study combining failure tolerance with incentives against strategic deviation and collusion.
About This Document
Xiaohui Bei, Wei Chen, and Jialin Zhang adapt collusion-resistant Nash equilibrium to consensus systems where agents may crash unexpectedly or manipulate a protocol for preferred outcomes. They present deterministic and randomized constructions with different collusion thresholds and establish impossibility results when deviators gain extra communication opportunities.
Why Bitcoin People May Care
This is not Bitcoin consensus, though it addresses a related question: what happens when participants are not merely faulty but strategic? Its synchronous model, preference assumptions, and communication rules differ from Nakamoto consensus and cryptocurrency incentives. The paper is theoretical background, not a direct security proof for Bitcoin or any deployed blockchain.
What You Receive
Purchase reveals the verified preserved PDF location for this document.
Document Details
- Title: Consensus Under Crash Failures and Strategic Manipulation
- Author / organization: Xiaohui Bei, Wei Chen, and Jialin Zhang
- Year: 2012
- Language: English
- Document type: Theoretical distributed-systems paper
- Pages: 39
CacheRat provides researched source-location and document-identification information. CacheRat does not claim ownership of the underlying third-party documentation.
