Description
TL;DR: An empirical paper finding that transaction malleability was real but not used widely enough before Mt. Gox closed to explain the exchange's claimed losses.
About This Document
Christian Decker and Roger Wattenhofer explain how a transaction's identifier could be changed without invalidating the underlying transfer, causing poorly designed accounting software to mistake a successful payment for a failed one. They then analyze more than a year of Bitcoin network traces preceding Mt. Gox's February 2014 closure. The observed attacks let the authors test the exchange's public explanation against network evidence.
Why Bitcoin People May Care
This paper separates a genuine protocol-era weakness from a much larger institutional claim. Centralized exchange software, internal accounting, and custody practices still mattered even when a malleated transaction appeared on the network. The research is a key post-collapse artifact, but it is not a complete forensic audit of every missing Mt. Gox coin.
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Document Details
- Title: Bitcoin Transaction Malleability and Mt. Gox
- Author / organization: Christian Decker and Roger Wattenhofer
- Year: 2014
- Language: English
- Document type: Research paper
- Pages: 13
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