Description
TL;DR: A formal analysis of how prior knowledge about destination choices can help a network adversary identify users despite onion routing.
About This Document
Joan Feigenbaum, Aaron Johnson, and Paul Syverson model anonymous communication in the Universally Composable framework. They abstract onion-routing behavior, allow an adversary to control part of the network, and derive how user destination probabilities and other users' choices affect anonymity as the network grows.
Why Bitcoin People May Care
This is not Bitcoin research, but onion routing and Bitcoin privacy meet wherever users try to hide network origin. The paper analyzes a formal black-box model, not every implementation or operational deployment of Tor. Its results clarify what can be inferred from probabilistic behavior and adversarial visibility; they do not promise anonymity for a particular user.
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Document Details
- Title: A Probabilistic Analysis of Onion Routing
- Author / organization: Joan Feigenbaum, Aaron Johnson, and Paul Syverson
- Year: 2011
- Language: English
- Document type: Anonymous-communications research paper
- Pages: 29
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